Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024)
Chapter: Front Matter
Nuclear Terrorism
Assessment of U.S. Strategies To Prevent, Counter,
and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction
______
Committee on Assessing and Improving
Strategies for Preventing, Countering,
and Responding to Weapons of Mass
Destruction Terrorism: Nuclear Threats
Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board
Division on Earth and Life Studies
Consensus Study Report
NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001
This activity was supported by a contract between the National Academy of Sciences and U.S. Department of Defense. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or agency that provided support for the project.
International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-70868-5
International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-70868-0
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/27215
Library of Congress Control Number: 2024943245
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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27215.
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COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING, COUNTERING, AND RESPONDING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TERRORISM: NUCLEAR THREATS
STEPHEN E. FLYNN (Chair), Northeastern University
MADELYN R. CREEDON (Vice Chair), The George Washington University
JULIE A. BENTZ, U.S. Army (retired)
MICHAEL DUNNING, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired)
ROBERT C. DYNES, University of California, San Diego
STEVEN A. FETTER, University of Maryland, College Park
WILLIAM H. GOLDSTEIN, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (until May 5, 2023)
EDWARD B. HELD, Sandia National Laboratories (retired, until May 19, 2022)
ELEANOR MELAMED, National Nuclear Security Administration (retired)
BRENDAN G. MELLEY, National Defense University
SCOTT ROECKER, Nuclear Threat Initiative
JESSICA STERN, Center for Naval Analyses (as of June 15, 2022)
KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, University of Michigan
RODNEY K. WILSON, Sandia National Laboratories (retired)
Technical Consultant
NICKOLAS ROTH, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Staff
MICHAEL T. JANICKE, Study Director
CHARLES FERGUSON, Senior Board Director
JENNY HEIMBERG, Senior Program Officer
AYANNA LYNCH, Research Assistant (until July 11, 2023)
KAYANNA WYMBS, Research Assistant
NUCLEAR AND RADIATION STUDIES BOARD
WILLIAM H. TOBEY (Chair), Los Alamos National Lab
AMY BERRINGTON de GONZALEZ (Vice Chair), The Institute of Cancer Research
SALLY A. AMUNDSON, Columbia University Medical Center
STEVEN M. BECKER, Old Dominion University
MADELYN CREEDON, The George Washington University
LAWRENCE T. DAUER, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center
SHAHEEN A. DEWJI, Georgia Institute of Technology
PAUL T. DICKMAN, Argonne National Laboratory
DONALD P. FRUSH, Duke University Medical Center
ALLISON M. MACFARLANE, The University of British Columbia
ELEANOR MELAMED, National Nuclear Security Administration (retired)
PER F. PETERSON, University of California, Berkeley
R. JULIAN PRESTON, Environmental Protection Agency
MONICA C. REGALBUTO, Idaho National Laboratory
Staff
CHARLES FERGUSON, Senior Board Director
MICHAEL T. JANICKE, Senior Program Officer
LAURA LLANOS, Financial Business Partner
DARLENE GROS, Senior Program Assistant
LESLIE BEAUCHAMP, Senior Program Assistant
BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES
ANN ARVIN (Chair), Stanford University
DENISE BAKEN, Shield Analysis Technology
TANYA BERGER-WOLF, Ohio State University
VALERIE BONHAM, Kennedy Krieger Institute
PATRICK BOYLE, Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc.
DOMINIQUE BROSSARD, University of Wisconsin-Madison
MAURO COSTA-MATTIOLI, Baylor University
GERALD EPSTEIN, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
INDIA HOOK-BERNARD, Engineering Biology Research Consortium
BERONDA MONTGOMERY, Michigan State University
LOUIS MUGLIA, Burroughs Wellcome fund
ROBERT NEWMAN, Aspen Institute
LUCILIA OHNO-MACHADO, University of California, San Diego
SUDIP PARIKH, American Association for the Advancement of Science
NATHAN PRICE, Institute for Systems Biology
SUSAN SINGER, St. Olaf College
DAVID WALT, Harvard Medical School
PHYLLIS WISE, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Staff
KAVITA BERGER, Director
ANDREW BREMER, Program Officer
NANCY CONNELL, Senior Scientist
JESSICA DE MOUY, Research Associate
CYNTHINA GETNER, Senior Financial Business Partner
LYLY LUHACHACK, Program Officer
DASIA MCKOY, Program Assistant
STEVEN MOSS, Senior Program Officer (until August 25, 2023)
CHRISTL SAUNDERS, Program Coordinator
AUDREY THEVENON, Senior Program Officer
TRISHA TUCHOLSKI, Associate Program Officer
SABINA VADNAIS, Research Associate
NAM VU, Program Assistant
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
RAYMOND JEANLOZ (Chair), University of California
ANDREW ALLEYNE, University of Minnesota
LINTON BROOKS, independent consultant
MARIANA BUDJERYN, Harvard University
MATTHEW BUNN, Harvard University
NANCY CONNELL, John Hopkins Center for Health Security
LINDA ELKINS-TANTON, Arizona State University
STEVEN FETTER, University of Maryland, College Park
DAVID FRANZ, Midwest Research Institute
RICHARD GARWIN, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, Stanford University
DIANE GRIFFIN, John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
MARGARET HAMBURG, Nuclear Threat Initiative
JOHN HILDEBRAND, University of Arizona
MORIBA JAH, University of Texas at Austin
ALASTAIR JOHNSTON, Harvard University
ROBERT LATIFF, R. Latiff Associates
JAMES LEDUC, University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston
JEFFREY LEWIS, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
HERBERT LIN, Stanford University
DOUGLAS LOVERRO, Loverro Consulting, LLC
RICHARD MESERVE, Carnegie Institution for Science
RICHARD MIES, The Mies Group, Ltd.
PETER PALESE, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai
LORA SAALMAN, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
VICTORIA SAMSON, Secure World Foundation
RACHEL SEGALMAN, University of California, Santa Barbara
JIM TIMBIE, Stanford University
Staff
MICAH LOWENTHAL, Director
RITA GUENTHER, Senior Program Officer
HOPE HARE, Administrative Assistant
CANDANCE HUNTINGTON, Research Associate
MARIE KIRKEGAARD, Program Officer (until 2022)
BENJAMIN RUSEK, Senior Program Officer
ALEX TEMPLE, Program Officer
BOARD ON CHEMICAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY
SCOTT COLLICK (Co-chair), DuPont De Nemours Chemical and Plastics
JENNIFER SINCLAIR CURTIS (Co-chair), University of California, Davis
GERARD BAILLELY, Proctor & Gamble Company
RUBEN G. CARBONELL, North Carolina State University
JOHN FORTNER, Yale University
KAREN I. GOLDBERG, University of Pennsylvania
JENNIFER M. HEEMSTRA, Emory University
JODIE LUTKENHAUS, Texas A&M University
SHELLEY D. MINTEER, University of Utah
AMY PRIETO, Colorado State University
MEGAN L. ROBERTSON, University of Houston
SALY ROMERO-TORRES, Thermo Fisher Scientific
REBECCA T. RUCK, Merck Research Laboratories
ANUP SINGH, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
VIJAY SWARUP, ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company
Staff
CHARLES FERGUSON, Senior Board Director
LINDA NHON, Program Officer (until July 2024)
LIANA VACCARI, Program Officer
BRENNA ALBIN, Senior Program Assistant (until January 2024)
THANH NGUYEN, Financial Business Partner
KAYANNA WYMBS, Research Assistant
MEGAN HARRIES, Program Officer (until 2022)
JESSICA WOLFMAN, Research Associate (until 2023)
AYANNA LYNCH, Research Assistant (until July 11, 2023)
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Reviewers
This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.
We thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
DAVID E. ASPNES (NAS), North Carolina State University
DANIEL BLUMENTHAL, U.S. Department of Energy
PETER BOYNTON, Northeastern University
BROOKE BUDDEMEIER, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
MICHAEL BURNS, TechSource, Inc.
MICHAEL DINE (NAS), University of California Santa Cruz
CHRISTOPHER FORD, Missouri State University, The Hoover Institution
TODD C. HELMUS, RAND Corporation, Pardee RAND Graduate School
JOHN M. HOLMES, STAX Engineering
MAJA LEHNUS, Private Consultant
DAVID LUCKEY, RAND Corporation
LINDA LOURIE, WestExec Advisors
CHESLAN SIMPSON, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this
report nor did they see the final draft before its release. The review of this report was overseen by SALLIE ANN KELLER (NAE), University of Virginia, and GRANT H. STOKES (NAE), MIT Lincoln Laboratory. They were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.
Acknowledgments
Many individuals, organizations, and U.S. government agencies contributed to the successful completion of this report. The committee and National Academies’ staff appreciate their kind assistance. Presenters for the numerous briefings are listed in appendix A. Volunteering their time to give valuable insight was crucial to the information gathered and compiled in this report.
The committee would like to give a special thanks to colleagues who helped arrange the meetings for this challenging project spanning many topics, domestic and international, and provided documents and reports necessary to assess the landscape of counterterrorism especially in a rapidly changing world confronted by current events. Those colleagues are:
- National Nuclear Security Administration: Jay Tilden, Dallas Boyd, Kasia Mendelson, and Victor Jones
- Department of Homeland Security: Gary Rasicot, Michael Kangior, William Bilicic, Frederick Breaux, and Gregory Abide
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Cynthia Jones
- Embassy of Canada, Washington, DC: Jodie McGrath
- National Security Council: Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Pranay Vaddi, and Brooke Samples
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Preface
“The most important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of the threat. The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin (sic) and al Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the public, the media, or in the Congress.[…] Al Qaeda’s new brand of terrorism presented challenges to U.S. governmental institutions that they were not well-designed to meet.”
The 9/11 Commission Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
“Nuclear and radiological threats will persist far into the future.”
Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security March 3, 2023
Are U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological1 terrorism keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape? Almost twenty years after the release of “The 9/11 Commission Report,” the unanimous conclusion of the National Academies Committee members who have prepared this study report is that, overall, they are not. The nightmare scenario of a terrorist nuclear attack on U.S. soil is a risk that has not diminished. The efforts to manage this risk must be expanded and they must be enduring.
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1 The UN defines nuclear terrorism as the unlawful and intentional use of radiological material with the intent to cause death, injury, or serious damage to property or the environment, or to compel “a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act” (see https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/english-18-15.pdf). Therefore, in the rest of this document, we will use “nuclear terrorism” to refer to terrorist acts that utilize either a detonable nuclear device or radioactive substances to cause harm.
Success has the potential to breed complacency. The significant attention paid to preventing terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the success of the U.S programs to reduce the terrorism risk has made it possible for a new generation of Americans to grow up without experiencing a catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland. The downside of this achievement is that, not having had a major shock or crisis that provides confirmation that a threat is clear and present, the nation’s attention has started to drift. This loss of focus, as it has in the past, can be expected in the future to translate into waning interest and investment in capabilities that are required to prevent, detect, deter, respond to, and recover from a future catastrophic terrorist event.
In the decade prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, most Americans paid little attention to the nuclear terrorism threat. The capture of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber rattling placed the nuclear risk back in the headlines. This has not, however, resulted in renewed attention to nuclear terrorism. Instead, it has contributed to the accelerated shift in focus by the national security community to Great Power Competition with Russia and China.
Preventing terrorist attacks, and effectively responding to and recovering from incidents when they occur, requires vigilance and sustained effort. The sophisticated counter-terrorism intelligence and military capabilities developed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, require continuous attention to ensure the necessary levels of interagency coordination and international, state, and local engagement. But challenges presented by state actors are now being prioritized over those posed by non-state actors. While this may be understandable given the rapidly changing threat environment, it risks the erosion of efforts that have worked to date in preventing terrorist groups from obtaining or building and deploying a nuclear or radiological device.
A cautionary tale for current times is what happened to U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War. During that conflict, the U.S. military services developed special forces that were highly capable of conducting joint special operations deep inside North Vietnam (Atlamazoglou 2020). When the war ended in 1975, however, there was a significant reduction in defense spending along with a shift by the armed services in training and strategic focus to conventional warfighting to counter the Soviet Union. Mission planning and interservice operability for conducting special operations degraded. The tragic consequence of this played out in April 1980 with the catastrophic failure of Operation Eagle Claw.
President Jimmy Carter had authorized a military rescue attempt of the 52 American diplomats and citizens taken hostage after the Iranian takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines were all involved in the operation, but only five of eight helicopters arrived at the staging area in operational condition and then one of the remaining helicopters crashed into a transport aircraft, destroying both aircraft and killing eight servicemen. (Kyle and Eidson 2002; Williamson 2020). The operation was then aborted. The postmortem investigation concluded that “a lack of coordination between military services—evidenced in part by compartmentalized training and inadequate equipment maintenance” contributed to the aborted operation
(Lambert 2023). The failure of Operation Eagle Claw2 illustrated how quickly “procedural memory” and defense competencies can fade once new priorities consume most of the funding and focus.
This committee is concerned that history may repeat itself, this time with respect to our counterterrorism capabilities. Fortunately, there are many dedicated people across the U.S. government who have been involved in and continue to support the successful management of the nuclear terrorism risk. These dedicated individuals recognize the imperative for sustaining capabilities and regular exercising of the capabilities needed to counter the risk.
All presidents since President Clinton have made confronting the threat of nuclear terrorism a top strategic priority. Most recently, in March 2023, President Joe Biden signed National Security Memorandum 19 (NSM-19) on “Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security” (The White House 2023).
In a meeting to coincide with the release of NSM-19, Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, the assistant to the president for homeland security, traced the decades-long bipartisan history of confronting this risk that predates the Cold War but expanded rapidly at its end. She emphasized the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, created by the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act. CTR was instrumental in helping to secure and dismantle significant numbers of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, secure fissile materials, and support nonproliferation programs in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union (Bernstein and Wood 2010). Had this not been done, Soviet nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise may have ended up in the hands of rogue actors. Dr. Sherwood-Randall also discussed the challenge of addressing the decrease in high-level political attention coincident with the collective success of nuclear security. In addition, she noted that “though countering terrorism has been a top priority for the United States for more than two decades, the terrorist threat has evolved […] It’s become more ideologically diffuse, and geographically diverse” (Johnson, 2023).
This committee embraces Dr. Sherwood-Randall’s admonition that “the Nation cannot lapse in this no-fail mission where the consequences are so high.” Nuclear terrorism represents a uniquely consequential threat to the United States and the entire global community that is domestic, international, and transnational. This reality makes the need for sustained U.S. leadership in addressing the ongoing nuclear terrorism threat a critical national priority. This report provides a number of findings and recommendations that support existing programs but also notes where more needs to be done and where U.S leadership is indispensable. The committee members are hopeful that Congress and the American people will take these recommendations to heart and implement them. The stakes involved with getting this right could not be higher.
As mentioned previously, the committee’s concerns are increasing, this time with respect to the United States’ counterterrorism capabilities as events evolved while this
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2 Out of the Operation Eagle Claw failure came a series of congressionally led reforms that created the special operations capabilities that in 2011 conducted the successful raid (Operation Neptune Spear) into Abbottabad, Pakistan, resulting in the death of Osama bin Laden (Counterterrorism Joint Task Force 1980).
report was under review. The persistence of the terrorism threat and its capacity to be a destabilizing geopolitical force was once again highlighted by the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas on Israel that killed 859 Israeli civilians and at least 345 Israeli soldiers and police officers, and the taking of over 240 hostages. The attacks also demonstrated the blurred line between state and nonstate actors, given Hamas’s role as a governing organization in the Gaza Strip and the support it has received from Iran and Gulf States (Boxerman 2023; Fabian 2023a, 2023b, 2023c).
Stephen E. Flynn, Chair
Madelyn R. Creedon, Vice Chair
Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Nuclear Threats
References
Atlamazoglou, Stavros. 2020. “How A ‘Successful Failure’ Deep behind Enemy Lines 50 Years Ago Changed the Way US Special-Operations Units Plan Missions.” Business Insider. Https://Www.Businessinsider.Com/Successful-Failure-Vietnam-War-Son-Tay-Raid-Changed-Special-Ops-2020-12.
Bernstein, Paul I., and Jason D. Wood. 2010. “The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction.” https://Inss.Ndu.Edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Case%20studies/Cswmd-Cs3.Pdf.
Boxerman, Aaron. 2023. “What We Know about the Death Toll in Israel from the Hamas-Led Attacks.” New York Times, November 12, 2023. https://www.Nytimes.Com/2023/11/12/World/Middleeast/Israel-Death-Toll-Hamas-Attack.Html.
Bunn, Matthew. 2016. “The Nuclear Security Summit: Wins, Losses, and Draws.” All Nuclear Security Matters. https://Dash.Harvard.Edu/Handle/1/37375266.
Cordesman, Anthony H. June 30, 2021. Iran and U.S. Strategy Looking beyond The JCPOA. Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-and-us-strategy-looking-beyond-jcpoa
Counterterrorism Joint Task Force. 1980. Holloway Commission. Edited by Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Earnhardt, Rebecca L., Brendan Hyatt, and Nickolas Roth. 2021. “A Threat to Confront: Far-Right Extremists and Nuclear Terrorism.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://Thebulletin.Org/2021/01/A-Threat-To-Confront-Far-Right-Extremists-And-Nuclear-Terrorism/.
Fabian, Emanuel. 2023a. “Authorities Name 395 Soldiers, 59 Police Officers Killed in Gaza War.” The Times of Israel, October 8, 2023. https://www.Timesofisrael.Com/Authorities-Name-44-Soldiers-30-Police-Officers-Killed-In-Hamas-Attack/.
—. 2023b. “Israeli Border Officer, 13 Palestinians Killed in West Bank Clashes, Airstrike.” The Times of Israel, October 19, 2023. https://www.Timesofisrael.Com/10-Israeli-Officers-Hurt-5-Palestinian-Killed-In-West-Bank-Clashes-Airstrike/.
—. 2023c. “Officer Dies after Being Critically Hurt in Terror Stabbing Near Jerusalem’s Old City.” The Times of Israel, November 6, 2023. https://www.Timesofisrael.Com/2-Police-Officers-Hurt-One-Critically-In-Terror-Stabbing-Near-Jerusalems-Old-City/.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1996. Emergency Management and Assistance. Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office.
Gill, Amandeep S. 2020. Nuclear Security Summits: A History. Palgrave Macmillan Cham.
Hoffman, Bruce, and Jacob Ware. 2023. “American Hatred Goes Global. How the United States Became a Leading Exporter of Whitesupremacist Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs. Accessed September 19, 2023.
International Atomic Energy Agency. 2023. “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).” Gov/2023/24. https://www.Iaea.Org/Sites/Default/Files/23/06/Gov2023-24.Pdf.
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 2022. “Global Fissile Material Report 2022.” Https://Fissilematerials.Org/Library/Gfmr22.Pdf.
Kyle, James H., and John Robert Eidson. 2002. The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander. Orion Crown Pub.
Lambert, Laura. 2023. “Operation Eagle Claw.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.Britannica.Com/Event/Operation-Eagle-Claw.
Lerner, K. Lee. 2022. “Policymakers Must Now Assume That Iran Has the Enriched Uranium It Needs to Build a Nuclear Weapon.” Taking Bearings. Harvard Blogs (June 1). Https://Blogs.Harvard.Edu/Kleelerner/Iran-Now-Has-The-Enriched-Uranium-It-Needs-To-Build-A-Nuclear-Weapon/.
Murphy, Francois. 2023. “Iran Expands Stock of Near-Weapons Grade Uranium, IAEA Reports No Progress.” Reuters, September 4, 2023. https://www.Reuters.Com/World/Middle-East/Iaea-Reports-No-Progress-Iran-Uranium-Stock-Enriched-60-Grows-2023-09-04/.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973. 10 Cfr Part 73—Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.
The White House. 2023. Fact Sheet: President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security.
Williamson, Justin. 2020. Operation Eagle Claw 1980: The Disastrous Bid to End the Iran Hostage Crisis Raid. Osprey Publishing.
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Contents
1.3 The U.S. Government Agencies Focused on Nuclear Terrorism
1.4 Organization of the Report
1.5 Previous/Relevant National Academies Reports
2.1 Introduction to Nuclear Threats
2.4 Tools and Types of Nuclear Terrorism
3 NEW DYNAMICS IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM POSE NEW RISKS
3.1 Terrorists’ Long-Standing Interest in Nuclear and Radiological Weapons
3.2 New Era in Nuclear Terrorism
3.3 Domestic and International Terrorism: Blurring Boundaries
3.4 The Continuum between State and Nonstate Actors
3.5 The Limits of Deterrence in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
3.6 New Types of Millenarianism and Terrorist Recruitment of Military Personnel
4 GEOPOLITICAL AND OTHER CHANGES ERODING LONG-STANDING NUCLEAR SECURITY NORMS AND PRACTICES
4.2 Weakening Political, Societal, and Technological Environment
4.3 The Era of Great Power Competition and Countering Nuclear Terrorism
5 THE EVOLVING CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR: ADAPTING APPROACHES AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES
5.1 Expanding Civil Nuclear Energy Sector Security
5.2 Expanding Global Nuclear Energy
5.4 International Standards and Regulations
5.5 The Important Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency
5.6 Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage
6 THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM
6.2 Security of Nuclear Materials
7 MANAGING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
7.1 Radioactive Sources—Risks and Benefits
7.2 NNSA’s Programs to Reduce Risk
7.3 Current Programs to Reduce Radiological Risk
7.4 The Evolving Security Landscape
7.5 Update on Radioactive Source Replacements
8 DETECTION AND INTERDICTION EFFORTS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE GLOBAL SUPPLY SYSTEM
8.1 The Long-Standing Challenge of Policing the Global Supply Chain
8.2 Efforts to Improve Detection and Interdiction
8.3 The Risk Nuclear Terrorism Poses to the Global Supply Chain
8.4 Enhancing the Means to Monitor Cargo Shipments
8.5 Detection and Interdiction at Ports of Entry
9 RESPONSE TO AND RECOVERY FROM NUCLEAR INCIDENTS
9.1 Current Response Capabilities
9.2 Messaging during Nuclear Incident
9.3 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Capabilities and Needs
9.4 Communications after a Nuclear Incident
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Boxes, Figures, and Tables
BOXES
2.2 Nuclear and Radiological Nuclear Material
FIGURES
3.1 Impact of terrorism in countries according to the Global Terrorism Index
4.1 Partner Nations in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
6.1 Agreement Nonproliferation Strength vs. Nuclear Theft Risk: Emerging Nuclear Countries
7.1 Workers remove a cesium-137 irradiator from Medstar Georgetown University Hospital in 2018
9.1 Blast damage zones after a 10 kT detonation (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2022)
TABLE
6.1 Countries That Have Eliminated Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials
Acronyms and Abbreviations
| AI | artificial intelligence |
| ARDP | Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program |
| CBP | Customs and Border Protection |
| CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear |
| CDC | Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |
| CFR | Code of Federal Regulations |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CIRP | Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project |
| CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
| CoM | consequence management |
| CONOPS | concept of operations |
| CPPNM | Conventional on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials |
| CRADA | Cooperative Research and Development Agreements |
| CRC | community reception center |
| CRCPD | Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors |
| CsCl | cesium chloride |
| CSI | Container Security Initiative |
| CSIS | Center for Strategic and International Studies |
| CST | civil support team |
| CTCP | Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation |
| CTPAT | Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism |
| CTR | Cooperative Threat Reduction |
| CWMD | countering weapons of mass destruction |
| DBT | design basis threat |
| DHS | Department of Homeland Security |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DOE | Department of Energy |
| DOE-NE | Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy |
| DOJ | Department of Justice |
| DOS | Department of State |
| DOT | Department of Transportation |
| DNN | Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation |
| DSIC | Decision Sciences International Corporation |
| DTRA | Defense Threat Reduction Agency |
| E.O. | executive order |
| EPA | Environmental Protection Agency |
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FRPCC | Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee |
| FTO | Foreign Terrorist Organization |
| GBq | Gigabecquerel |
| GICNT | Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism |
| GTRI | Global Threat Reduction Initiative |
| GW | Gigawatt |
| HALEU | high assay low enriched uranium |
| HE | high explosive |
| HEU | highly enriched uranium |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| ICSANT | International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| IND | improvised nuclear device |
| INL | Idaho National Laboratory |
| INS | International Security Program |
| INSTAR | International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors |
| INTERPOL | International Criminal Police Organization |
| IPS | International Port Security |
| ISI | Islamic State of Iraq |
| ISIS | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria |
| ISPS | International Ship and Port Facility Security Code |
| ITWG | International Technical Working Group |
| JAEIC | Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee |
| JTOT | Joint Technical Operations Team |
| LEU | low enriched uranium |
| LINAC | Linear Accelerator |
| LMIC | low- to middle-income countries |
| MDM | misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information |
| MOX | mixed oxide |
| MMPDS | Multi-Mode Passive Detection System |
| MPC&A | Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting |
| NAFTA | North American Free Trade Agreement |
| NARR | National Alliance for Radiological Readiness |
| NAS | National Academy of Science |
| NASEM | National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCBC | National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center |
| NCRP | National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements |
| NCTC | National Counterterrorism Center |
| NDA | nondisclosure agreement |
| NEST | Nuclear Emergency Support Team |
| NGA | National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency |
| NHSI | Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative |
| NIH | National Institutes of Health |
| NII | nonintrusive inspection |
| NIC | National Intelligence Council |
| NIMS | National Incident Management Systems |
| NNSA | National Nuclear Security Administration |
| NOAA | National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration |
| NPP | nuclear power plant |
| NPT | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NRC | Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| NRO | National Reconnaissance Office |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSDD | Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence |
| NSM | National Security Memorandum |
| NSTS | National Source Tracking System |
| NTD | Nuclear Threat Device |
| O9A | Order of 9 Angles |
| ODNI | Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
| ORS | Office of Radiological Security |
| OSRP | Off-Site Source Recovery Project |
| PPE | personal protective equipment |
| PSI | Proliferation Security Initiative |
| R&D | research and development |
| RANET | Response Assistance Network |
| RDD | radiological dispersal device |
| RED | radiological exposure device |
| REMVE | racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist |
| REP | radiological emergency preparedness |
| RERT | radiological emergency response team |
| RIM | Russian Imperial Movement |
| ROSS | radiological operations support specialist |
| SDGT | specially designated global terrorist |
| SLTT | state, local, tribal, and territorial |
| SME | subject matter expert |
| SMR | small modular reactor |
| START | Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism |
| TBq | Terabecquerel |
| TEU | twenty-foot equivalent unit |
| U.S. | United States |
| USCG | United States Coast Guard |
| USG | United States Government |
| USGS | U.S. Geological Survey |
| U.N. | United Nations |
| UNSCR 1540 | U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 |
| WMD | weapon of mass destruction |
